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Wn.Ls-R:svoCATION BY CHANGE IN CmcuMSTANCES-EFFECT OF A SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT-Testator's will, executed in
1944, named his wife executrix and sole devisee. One month before his death
in 1952 he entered into a detailed separation and property settlement agreement
with her in which, though not referring directly to the will, the wife released any
present, future or after-acquired interest in the same realty as was devised in
the will. The widow's offering of the will for probate was contested by the
heirs. The lower court directed a verdict for the contestants on the ground that

1955]

RECENT DECISIONS

1019

the agreement operated to revoke the will. On appeal, held, reversed. Since
neither a divorce alone nor a property settlement alone will work a revocation by
operation of law because of the change in circumstance, a separation and property
settlement agreement will not do so. Price v. Price, (Tenn. App. 1954) 269
s.w. (2d) 920.
Generally, statutes will determine whether a jurisdiction will recognize any
form of marital severance as working a revocation of the provisions for one spouse
in the will of the other because of the change in circumstances. Tennessee
appears to be the only jurisdiction completely lacking a statute on revocation of
wills.1 The statutes of other states may be divided between those providing
specific means for revocation of a will, but with a saving clause recognizing
revocation by change in circumstances,2 and those without such a saving clause,8
some of which expressly deny the possibility of revocation by change in circumstances.4 As divorce was relatively unknown at English common law, the
change in circumstances concept was there limited to cases where marriage or
marriage and birth of issue were held to revoke the prior will of a woman or
man respectively.15 Though the concept is expanded in this country,6 prior to
the instant holding the question of whether a separation and property settlement
is included within it had been decided only twice. Michigan appears to support
the decision, 7 while a lower Pennsylvania court does not. 8 In contrast, the same
1 Blackard, "The Effects of the Enactment of the 1941 Wills Act," 17 TENN. L. R:sv.
447 at 450-451 (1942).
2Not including divorce as one of the means, e.g.: Mass. Laws Ann. (1933) c. 191,
§§8, 9; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §702.9; Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §2107.33;
Wis. Stat. (1953) §238.14; Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1945) §6-306. Including divorce as one
of the means: Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §§525.19, 525.191.
8 Not including divorce as one of the means, e.g.: Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1953)
§§70-74; Iowa Code Ann. (1950) tit. 32, §633.10; 13 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney,
1949) §§34, 35, 40; Tex. Rev. Stat. (Vernon, 1941) art. 8285; W.Va. Code (1949)
§§4044-4045. Including divorce as one of the means: Ala. Code (1940; Supp. 1953) tit.
61, §§9(1), 26; Fla. Stat. (1953) §§731.12, 731.14, 732.261; Ga. Code Ann. (1935;
Supp. 1954) tit. 113, §§401-408; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1949) c. 59, §§610-611; Pa. Stat.
Ann. (Purdon, 1950) tit. 20, §§180.5, 180.7; Wash. Rev. Stat. (1953) tit. 11, c. 12.040,
12.050.
4 Not including divorce as one of the means: R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 566, §§16-18.
Including divorce as one of the means: Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947; Supp. 1953) §§60-113,
60-ll5, 60-407; N.C. Gen. Stat. (1953) c. 31, §§5.I to 5.4. See Model Probate Code
§§51-54 (1946). Including divorce and annulment among the means: Ind. Stat. Ann.
(1953) §§6.506, 6.508.
5 ATKINsoN, WILLS, 2d ed., §85 (1953). The Statute of Wills of 1837 abrogated the
doctrine in England. 7 Wm. IV & 1 Viet., c. 26, §20 (1837). For a further historical
discussion, see 5 Wis. L. Rav. 387 (1930).
6 See the cases cited in notes 9, IO, and 11 infra.
7 In re Blanchard's Estate, 267 Mich. 189, 255 N.W. 190 (1934), noted in 33 MICH.
L. Rav. 637 (1935). The case is weak authority, however, since the court appears to lean
on extrinsic factors, e.g., that the testator and his wife had been reunited before his death.
Accord, Walter v. Pugh, 30 Ohio Op. 561 (1945), holding that an antenuptial property
settlement was not an implied revocation of the wife's will, wherein the man later to be
her husband was made residuary legatee on condition that they were married.
s In re Morris' Estate, 22 Pa. Dist. R. 466 (1912). This case, too, is weak authority
on the point because the holding, a short and alternative one, displays some confusion in
the court's mind between revocation by change in circumstances, ademption and satisfaction.
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court that decided the principal case and the heavy majority of courts interpreting statutes with the saving clause have held that provisions for the spouse
in a will are revoked by a divorce and a property settlement,9 or an annulment
and a property settlement,1° occasionally with considerable liberality as to what
constitutes the requisite property adjustment. 11 As jurisdictions with statutes
lacking the saving clause hold that a divorce even with such a settlement will
not work a revocation12 because the enumerated methods are deemed exclusive,13 argument as to the effect of a separation and property agreement on that
basis is seldom attempted. Rather, the issue generally is whether the agreement
constitutes such a subsequent writing by the testator as may revoke the will.14
The largely unexplored issue of whether the property disposition alone works
as a satisfaction of the provisions for the spouse is also present.15 The problem
is thus narrowed to whether, under statutes allowing revocation by change in
circumstances, a distinction should be drawn between divorce and separation,
each accompanied by property settlements. An affirmative answer would unThough the Wyoming court in Johnston v. Laird, 48 Wyo. 532 at 544-545, 52 P. (2d)
1219 (1935), saw the holding as involving revocation, the Pennsylvania statute then in
force lacked a saving clause. Pa. Laws 1833, No. 250-1, §§13-16. Because of this, a tes·tator's divorce was held not to produce a revocation. Jones' Estate, 211 Pa. 364, 60 A. 915
(1905). For indications obiter that, had the statutes so permitted, similar actions might
amount to such a revocation, see Swann v. Swann, 131 W.Va. 555, 48 S.E. (2d) 425
(1948). Cf. In re Will of Watson, 213 N.C. 309, 195 S.E. 772 (1938).
9 Rankin v. McDearmon, (Tenn. App. 1953) 270 S.W. (2d) 660; Estate of Kort,
260 Wis. 621, 51 N.W. (2d) 501 (1952); Younker v. Johnson, 160 Ohio St. 409, 116
N.E. (2d) 715 (1954), distinguishing Codner v. Caldwell, 156 Ohio St. 197, 101 N.E.
(2d) 901 (1951), noted in 23 Umv. Cm. L. furv. 277 (1954). Contra, Hertrais v. Moore,
325 Mass. 57, 88 N.E. (2d) 909 (1949), noted in 50 CoL. L. REv. 531 (1950). The
earlier cases are collected in the annotation, 18 A.L.R. (2d) 697 at 705 (1951). See 5
WBS'I'. REs. L. Rirv. 394 (1954).
10 Johnston v. Laird, note 8 supra.
11 See In re McGraw's Estate, 228 Mich. 1, 199 N.W. 686 (1924), wherein a socalled waiver of alimony rights was deemed sufficient.
12Jreland v. Terwilliger, (Fla. 1951) 54 S. (2d) 52; Davis v. Davis, (Fla. 1952) 57
S. (2d) 8 (the section of the Florida statute last cited, note 3 supra, had not yet taken
effect); Merritt v. Merritt, (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) 158 S.W. (2d) ll6. Contra, Matter
of Gilmour, 146 Misc. ll3, 260 N.Y.S. 761 (1932). That this opinion is highly questionable, see Matter of Sussdorff, 182 Misc. 69, 43 N.Y.S. (2d) 762 (1943). The earlier
cases are collected in the annotation, 18 A.L.R. (2d) 697 at 708 (1951).
13 But see In re Estate of Brown, 139 Iowa 219, 117 N.W. 260 (1908). Further,
several states lacking the saving clause will allow revocation of a will due to a change in
circumstances when the change is of early common law heritage, i. e., marriage or marriage
plus birth of issue. Durfee, ''Revocation of Wills by Subsequent Change in the Condition
or Circumstances of the Testator," 40 M:rcH. L. Rnv. 406 at 408-412 (1942).
14Titus v. Bassi, 182 App. Div. 387, 169 N.Y.S. 49 (1918); Matter of Crounse,
168 Misc. 359, 6 N.Y.S. (2d) 32 (1938), affd. 261 App. Div. 77, 24 N.Y.S. (2d) 568
(1941); Matter of Cote's Will, 195 Misc. 410, 87 N.Y.S. (2d) 555 (1949); Estate of
Crane, 6 Cal. (2d) 218, 57 P. (2d) 476 (1936); Bennett v. Forrest, 24 Cal. (2d) 485,
150 P. (2d) 416 (1944); In re Bartolo's Estate, 124 Cal. App. (2d) 727, 269 P. (2d) 30
(1954); Swann v. Swann, note 8 supra; Merritt v. Merritt, note 12 supra.
15 See In re Brown's Estate, note 13 supra; Swann v. Swann, note 8 supra; Matter
of Swords, 120 Misc. 427, 199 N.Y.S. 672 (1923), affd. 208 App. Div. 852, 204 N.Y.S.
952 (1924); Rash v. Bogart, 226 Ala. 284, 146 S. 814 (1933). Language approved in
Berg v. Berg, 201 Minn. 179 at 189, 275 N.W. 836 (1937), suggests that this might be
the issue involved even under a statute with a saving clause.
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doubtedly be based on the voluntary and more often temporary nature of separation as compared to judicially decreed divorce. But a distinction strictly along
such lines is not entirely satisfactory, for the primary basis of the decisions in
the divorce cases is the presumed intent of the testator, rather than a judicial
policy determination against disinherison as in the cases of marriage or marriage
and birth of issue.16 And it is certainly not unreasonable to presume, in cases
like the instant one, that the intent of the testator would be to revoke the provisions for his spouse in his will. To the objection that such an intent ought not
to be conclusively, nor even as readily, presumed as in an instance of divorce,17
the possibility of relying on a rebuttable presumption of revocation may be
suggested.18

PaulR.Haerle
1 6 Durfee, ''Revocation of Wills by Subsequent Change in the Condition or Circumstances of the Testator," 40 Mi:CH. L. REv. 406 at 416 (1942). Compare the thinking of
the court in Will of Battis, 143 Wis. 234, 126 N.W. 9 (1910), with that in Hoy v. Hoy,
93 Miss. 732, 48 S. 903 (1908).
17 Rankin v. McDeannon, note 9 supra; Estate of Kort, note 9 supra. See annotation,
18 A.L.R. (2d) 697 at 700 (1951). See also 23 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 277 at 279-280
(1954), where it is suggested that some language in Younker v. Johnson, note 9 supra,
implies a contraiy view.
18 This solution has been urged for cases involving divorce with a property settlement.
Durfee, "Revocation of Wills by Subsequent Change in the Condition or Circumstances
of the Testator," 40 Mi:CH. L. REv. 406 at 416 (1942); 50 Coi.. L. REv. 531 at 534
(1950).

